The paper explains the difficulties that have been emerging for the Southern Caucasus regarding these countries' relationship with and towards the EU. Through the deconstruction of the area's particularities and specificities, and its framing in the EU's policy to the region, this paper aims at analyzing the implications of the transition efforts and stability in the area for Europe in general, along with the different roles each of these pieces -Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia -play in the complex strategic Caucasian puzzle.
INTRODUCTION
The uncertainties in the new international order, marked by growing interdependence as a result of the processes of globalization, along with fragmentation tendencies, together with the numerous threats to international security, contribute to the complexity of the international scenario, launching questions about the balancing of norms and interests, and the juxtaposition and coordination of objectives and resources. In this context, the clarification of the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the Caucasus, through the identification of competing interests and cooperation opportunities, along with the analysis of the agendas of these distinct actors, are relevant for the understanding of the EU's eastern neighborhood policy in a politico-institutional and security perspective.
The southern Caucasus, including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, despite its commonly applied label, is a heterogeneous region where these three different states present different political and institutional stages of development, distinct political cultures, and disparate paths in their transition courses towards democratization. This implies complexity in any policy directed at the region, since a multilevel and encompassing approach to the problems is demanded.
In this context, from words to action many difficulties have been emerging regarding these countries' relationship with and towards the EU. The general guidelines defined and the patchy and volatile situation in the southern Caucasus have raised numerous interrogations about the applicability, sustainability and viability of a EU policy of cooperation to the area along with the differentiated responses and expectations from the envisaged countries towards the proposals and measures which have emerged. To which extent might cooperation prevail in the midst of competing interests? How far might the Caucasus' different conjugations of interests and practices affect the region's relations with the EU?
What impact might EU policies towards the area have in building security and stability, at the political-institutional level? How might the Union's democracy building instruments assist the transition courses in the southern Caucasus? In this process, to which extent the deep differences in the stages of transition, the diverging interpretations about the post-Soviet reality and the interlinkages between the internal and external developments within these countries and between them make a difference? How far are intra and inter-state conflicts in the area affected by the Union's strategy towards the region? Which is better: enhancing security and raising stability, or instead fostering competition and rivalry
THEORETICAL CONTEXTUALIZATION: FRAMING NEIGHBORHOOD RELATIONS IN A NORMATIVE CONCEPTUALIZATION
The political development of Europe in a time of profound changes, including institutional reform and a new wave of enlargement, in a difficult socio-economic setting, needs solid foundations. The definition of a common security and defense strategy is a fundamental pillar in this foundations' structure. This political The post-cold war order offered new rules for the international game, requiring adjustments to the new conditions. In this new setting, the European Union has increasingly gained relevance and international capacity to act in external affairs. The policy of enlargement has been a concrete example of EU's external action, and of how it has been promoting and supporting transition efforts towards democracy and functioning market economies. Moreover, in its new geographical limits, the EU has empowered a cooperative approach towards its neighbors, in order to avoid feelings of exclusion or eventually create a new division line in Europe between those "in" and those "out", through, for example, the negotiation and signing of association and cooperation agreements with the former Soviet republics and Russia. This developmental approach has been extended to other regions, in particular Africa and the Middle East, and has also included trade negotiations and environmental measures agreed within the framework of multilateral fora. This demonstrates the wide engagement of the EU at the global 1 The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
2 Agreement reached at the Brussels Council, June 2004.
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We will here concentrate on a sub-dimension of European foreign policy, problematizing security within the broader framework of the CFSP, with a clear emphasis on stabilization, transition and democratization.
Security is a complex and dynamic concept that includes interdisciplinary and integrative aspects. It is understood as a multi-faceted term covering a wide range of military and non-military challenges with wide implications for international, national and regional peace and stability. It is transversal regarding international actors, of a governmental and non-governmental nature, and the decision-making centers from the highest level of the state to its regional dimensions, taking place in a bilateral or multilateral context, as a way of responding to a multiplicity of relations, pressure factors and leverage power to direct, or at least, condition change. In addition, there is a clear linkage between internal and external threats to security, which render the concept added complexity in its understandings and dealings. The feelings of insecurity associated to the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 followed by attacks in Europe (such as in Madrid and London), attest the pertinence of this encompassing understanding of security, as well as the need for encompassing responses to these global threats.
The EU as a security community shares a set of values and norms built on a soft and multilateral approach to security, from which benefit-driven outputs are both an end and a self-sustaining factor, both for the Union and for the promotion of security in its vicinity. "If we consider security as a matter of dialogue, exchange, trust building and civilian action more than military superiority, then the EU has a role to play." 3 These soft security areas, where the EU has increasingly been gaining relevance, are fundamental as a basis for the Union's involvement at the global level, and for its influence as a "normative model" 4 . By a process of gradual socialization of security approaches, meaning a set of norms and values allowing an approximation to EU policies and ways of dealing, it aims at endorsing an enlarged security community in its still much uncertain neighborhood.
THE EU'S STRATEGY TOWARDS THE CAUCASUS
The EU's presence in the south Caucasus goes back to the early days after the break-up of the Soviet Union. 5 As a part of the stabilization approach developed by the EU for the region, humanitarian aid and technical assistance programs were and eventually contributing to the fostering of regional cooperation. 6 However, the results of this cooperation were limited to low levels of harmonization due to difficulties regarding the implementation of reforms, and mostly to the inability of the EU to address the root causes of regional instability, in particular the intra-state conflicts in Georgia and the inter-state dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. 7 The development of civilian and military capabilities for external action within the EU, and the expansion of its legal and institutional boundaries were prompted by a set of perceived changes in the international context, most notably the end of the Soviet Union, the September 11 attacks and the global war on terror, as well as events in its periphery, of particular relevance here, the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia. These prompted the Union's attention and further awareness of the southern Caucasus as an area of strategic relevance in political, economic and security terms, a realization that was consubstantiated in the region's inclusion in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). 
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Country Reports with a bilateral character and according to the most pressing needs of each of these countries, reflecting the political, economic, social and institutional situation in these countries as a basis for the definition of the Action Plans. These "suited to fit" Action Plans aim at bridging the differences between needs and capabilities, establishing concrete and simultaneously ambitious targets in distinct areas for an integrated development of each of these partners, particularly in the process of politico-economic and democratic transition. "The EU wishes to see reinforced, credible and sustained commitment towards democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and progress towards the development of a market economy." The Paper adds emphasis to strengthening the rule of law and promoting conflict settlement, along with an explicit reference to the issue of energy "as the southern Caucasus is an important region both for the production (the Caspian basin) and the transit of energy". This implied further engagement in the area and a closer monitoring of developments which became clearer from 2003, the year that marked a "new beginning" for the EU with the launching of its first field missions. 10 In this context, wide range of policy areas and each of the difficult chapters has to be tackled and they have a number of very precise points within them". 12 But the lack of a cohesive and well-defined EU strategy for the area might also be a factor hampering the negotiations, as further analyzed.
The strategic importance of the region in economic, and particularly energy resources, should also be underlined. Parallel to political-democratic efforts, the EU has been promoting initiatives aimed at enhancing its presence in terms of trade, transport and energy, through the implementation of technical assistance programs, particularly TRACECA and INOGATE. 13 The goal is to develop energy transport corridors (oil and gas), linking Europe to the Asian markets, crossing the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. It is also one of promoting regional integration of the pipelines' systems, working both as a catalyst for regional cooperation and as a confidence-building measure, much needed in a setting of instability. Economic assets, in particular energy resources, might either prompt further cooperation or instead foster competition, thus a delicate matter in need of careful handling.
This deeper commitment was also framed within the contours of the wording of the security strategy presented by Javier Solana at the Thessalonica Council in 
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ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 2 2013 83 principles for common external action, it identified as the main threats to peace and security, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, failed states and terrorism. The priorities identified include the extension of the zone of peace and security to all of Europe; promotion of effective multilateralism, through the strengthening of the international order and on the basis of multilateral institutions and international law; and response to the new threats to security, focusing on its dynamic character and on the need to deal with them in a preventive way, through political and economic means. 14 However, to achieve these objectives the Union's foreign policy has to be more active, more coherent (better coordination between the different decision-making levels), more capable (regarding the management of crisis, diplomatic capabilities and means of information), and developed in collaboration with other partners (such as the United States and Russia). Thus, the EU's neighborhood policy goals are closely interconnected with the principles defined in the Union's security strategy, demonstrating the commonly felt need for the building of stability in its vicinity as a way of promoting and expanding security.
In this definition of the Union's policies regarding its neighborhood, the combination of "good will gestures" and the fostering of principles at the core of the EU functioning, such as good governance, democratization and cooperation, with elements of "imposition" as concerns adjustments in ways and practices, has elicited disparate reactions. These have ranged from interpretations of the wider Europe policy as "mitigation of negative enlargement impacts on new border regions; rhetorical, low cost diplomacy to try and placate the excluded; [and] transformation of the states of the rest of Europe in line with common European values and with the benefits of progressive integration. The first objective is worthwhile but not strategic. The second is unworthy cynicism, to be rejected. The third is the strategic objective, which political scientists term 'Europeanization'." 15 Whether the EU normative dimension will become explicit or whether Europeanization 16 will be coined with "coercive imposition" is an interesting question to be followed. European states participate in these arrangements but only with the inclusion of the southern Caucasus in the ENP did their engagement become better framed, with the EU becoming an active player in the area. This is an innovative aspect of the ENP: the wish to set a holistic guiding-framework for its neighborhood, as a special category in its external relations. An objective broad in its goals and encompassing in its subjects, carrying with it the challenges associated to including a very different set of countries within the same policy-label, as further analyzed with regard to the Caucasus. complemented by an analysis of how these countries and the region as a whole respond to the Union's approaches.
THE EU AND THE CAUCASUS: SEARCHING FOR COMMONALITY IN
In general, the EU's approach to the south Caucasus has been a regional one, though after the independences of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were consolidated, and the differences between them surfaced with the erosion of the Soviet imposed harmonization, a differentiated approach to the problems of each of these countries was demanded. This is a principle upon which the ENP is based, through the negotiation of the Action Plans and which is complemented by a regional focus on stabilization and cooperation, which in instances collide, rendering the EU approach towards the area difficult to discern. On the one hand, it offers bilateral negotiations through the Action Plans mechanism, but on the other hand it addresses the region as a whole (the above mentioned holistic framework), in a regional approach that not always fits well the local political, social and economic mismatches. Thus, the southern Caucasus has been described as suffering from a "proximity-distance paradox"
17
: it is not so close to the EU core that its problems are clearly perceived and addressed by the European states, but it is not so far away as to be irrelevant, constituting both a source of opportunities due to the region's natural resources and potential market, and of instability, given the nature of political regimes, the ongoing conflicts and regional mistrust.
This regionally differentiated approach promoted by the EU has at times conflicted with its desire to promote regional cooperation, as was the case when disagreements between Azerbaijan and Cyprus led to the suspension of the negotiations of the Action Plans with the three southern Caucasus countries. 18 
R E T R A C T E D
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 2 2013 86 with a reality that is new for the Union, a tone of unwillingness to assume a level of differentiation towards the region, and the simultaneously felt need to respond to particular challenges, along with the type of restraints ENP progress is under. The ENP Strategy Paper states this need for differentiation which should be reflected in the Action Plans, taking into account "geographic location, the political and economic situation, relations with the European Union and with neighbouring countries, reform programmes, where applicable, needs and capacities, as well as perceived interests", while also stressing that it should simultaneously be based on a commitment to shared values and be compatible with a coherent regional approach. 19 The stated aims that have been revealing are not always easy to reconcile.
This attempt at a regional approach by the EU has been met by an objective differentiation of positioning by Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku. There is little information exchanged between the three capitals, and coordination efforts have been supplanted by competition, since each of these states attaches differentiated degrees of importance to the ENP. 20 For Armenia, it is a way of breaking from isolation and getting financial assistance; for Azerbaijan, which originally was not so enthusiastic, it has been a way of maintaining an independent and balanced foreign 
87
Romania on what has been called a Baltic Sea-Black Sea axis. 21 In addition, the This regional diversity and lack of cohesiveness demand from the EU differentiated approaches in a common normative and stability oriented strategy.
Thus, the EU contribution to regional development through conflict settlement and the implementation of democratic reforms should not be a linear and rigid process, but a multilayered and adjustable one. Nevertheless, the question whether the EU has the means and the political willingness necessary to implement such a flexible strategy, and whether the Action Plans in the context of the neighborhood policy might be effective instruments for accomplishing the Union's goals for the southern Caucasus, remains to be seen.
In addition, the three countries should build common ground on how and whether they stand towards the EU, starting from a clear definition of their specificities along with the possible framing of regional cooperation. "[C]rucial issues like the 'region-ness' of the south Caucasus will have to be discussed in order to determine where the societies of the south Caucasus currently are, where they want to go and whether it makes sense at all to discuss a possible movement closer to the European Union in categories like 'region'." 25 Thus, a common regional approach might have to be based not so much on the search for a common identity or for shared political cultures, but more on pragmatic aspects of cooperation in political and economic terms that might suggest rapprochement, eventually building 21 
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GEORGIA
The The EU's concern has been expressed in a rapid response to Georgia's request for assistance to the reform of its judiciary system with the expeditious deployment of a Rule of Law Mission in the country. In the words of Javier Solana, it is "key to ensuring stability and also growth", demonstrating both that the EU is fully committed to supporting Georgia, and that it can react quickly. 27 Following the 
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The talks between Georgian central authorities and Ossetian representatives are due to resume, after many ups and downs in diplomatic contacts. 31 The situation has hardened and Moscow has increasingly been assuming an assertive tone, playing against Tbilisi and using support to the separatists as leverage power and pressure over the Georgian authorities and their new politically western looking approach. Georgia has asked for the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping troops from the area, which it understands as perpetuating instability. Eduard Kokoity, the South Ossetian president is against the withdrawal of Russian troops. "We are a sovereign state, a state that is independent from Georgia. Apart from Russian peacekeepers, no one will be stationed on the territory of the republic of South
Ossetia. Those countries that have already responded favorably to the Georgian proposal should think twice. We have in mind here Ukraine and the Baltic states.
Even morally, those states have no right to send peacekeeping contingents here, because they are supporting Georgia, they are arming Georgia." 32 For Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh "will never be a part of Azerbaijan".
36
Yerevan is not willing to discuss withdrawal from Azerbaijani territories until Nagorno-Karabakh is recognized as independent. For the Karabakh authorities, a peace settlement must have the republic's consent, thus its participation in the negotiations is considered mandatory, and must not entail vertical subordination to Baku. For Askadii Ghukasian, president of the unrecognized republic, NagornoKarabakh has to be a part of the talks. The EU has been present at the negotiations through its member state France (co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group), and its Special Representative for the South
Caucasus, who has also been working on bringing the parties together and gathering regional and international support for a peaceful and final solution to the conflict, though within severe contextual limits.
For the EU, stability in the Caucasus is fundamental as concerns an alternative provider of energy resources, and in the global fight against terror, justifying its increased involvement in the region's problems. "In all of these conflicts, we have not had substantial progress for too long, and we think that this is not only a great problem for the populations concerned -both politically and economically -but a source of threat to the international community, which the international community can no longer afford." 39 The EU has been extending its support to the area, mainly through economic channels. Underlining the advantages that might arise from the finding of a political settlement, particularly regarding economic aspects and social development, the EU's pressure over the energy assets of the region might . However, the economic factor might play either to the pacification of the situation or instead to an aggravation and deterioration of the conditions. It might be a fundamental bargaining element towards the finding of a political settlement, since the perpetuation of the conflict hampers economic recovery and further relations in the area; but it might also negatively condition the negotiations process given the international high demand for oil and gas, which might be played in this case by Baku to its most advantage.
So, the way this economic factor will be used in the negotiations will be a fundamental aspect in the clarification of positions and bargaining elements in the stabilization of the Caucasus. 
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as an important factor for the country's economic progress and as a guarantee of its security. 43 The territories of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the secessionist Nagorno-Karabakh serve as a buffer for Russia against intrusion from Turkey and Iran. Therefore, it is in the interest of Russia to minimize the influence of the latter two countries in the region and to extend its military power in the Caucasus.
Additionally, Russia not only seeks to profit economically from the oil and gas reserves under the Caspian sea, but also to gain some form of control over the energy sources and lines of supply in the Caspian basin as an instrument of global power. 44 Thus, Moscow carefully balances its relationship with the west, with the maintenance of political, military and economic influence in the Caucasian region.
The intricacy of the issues regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict demands an innovative approach ranging between broad autonomy and independence. The international community faces, therefore, the task of creating a new reasoning that addresses the logic driving the self-declared states, in order to be able to respond effectively to the current demands. The most pressing issues include the definition of a formal status for the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic; the addressing of
Stepanakert demands as regards security guarantees as a condition for the Armenian withdrawal from the occupied territories; provisions for the safe return of refugees; and the role and composition of the peacekeeping forces to monitor the agreement as well as international guarantees. A long-term solution to the conflict must therefore entail a balanced response to the opposing demands of the parties, and take into account the regional context of cooperation and competition in order to gather the necessary consensus, even if as a minimum common denominator, to be acceptable and accepted.
THE EU AND THE CAUCASUS: AN ASSESSMENT
Besides finding internal balance, in addressing the current security challenges, the EU must attend to its new geographical limits, stretching to Russian borders and the former Soviet area, and having as "outsiders" countries such as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, which already have shown interest in joining the organization.
Aiding these states in their transition course, a difficult challenge particularly with regard to poor governance, lack of political and institutional stability, and economic and social problems, to which the ongoing conflicts add a further element of complexity, may constitute an important step forward in enhancing European In fact, the EU's political-economic and civilian role, including policing, enhancing the rule of law, civil administration, the promotion of good governance and respect for human rights -known as "soft areas" -, has made a difference in different areas, with the EU response to new and old challenges being solidly constructed over non-military means. The EU is a relevant foreign player in the south Caucasus: it has been a provider of financial, technical and humanitarian assistance, and it has shown willingness to deepen its presence, helping to "reinforce stability and security and contribute to efforts at conflict resolution", as well as to strengthen "the EU's contribution to promoting the settlement of regional conflicts". 45 
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To Armenia, greater EU involvement is a means of breaking its regional isolation and, as such, it has initially requested EU assistance regarding the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh, and then raising the stakes and asking for political support to solve the conflict. Azerbaijan, assuming a more distanced tone, has not asked for direct EU involvement in the resolution of the conflict since it has been disappointed with the Union's unwillingness to clearly state the Armenian occupation of Azeri territory. 48 The EU has insisted that a solution should be found within the OSCE Minsk group framework, offering limited assistance to the process, now strengthened by the presence of the EUSR. Azerbaijan has maintained a selfsustaining and distant foreign policy between the west and Russia, avoiding direct dependence on any of them. Its privileged position as an oil producer confers on Baku added leverage power, which Yerevan lacks, and Tbilisi struggles for.
The Union's neighbourhood has become a priority for EU action in a realist perception of European problems and capabilities, as the European security strategy indicates in its offering of a framework for action to render the EU more operational and effective.
Small steps need to be taken, on the basis of accorded priorities and the definition of common strategies. In this sense, the ENP still has to demonstrate how it will conciliate regional differentiation with the promotion of regional cooperation, and the extent to which the sharing of European values can be conciliated with the weight of history, and the specificities of this much diversified region.
"[T]the EU is more 'fashionable' and by all means wealthier club of nations.
The EU offers a unique combination of economic power and possibilities for a political dialogue. This may be an added value to conventional multilateral diplomacy under UN or OSCE auspices. (…) [T]he EU could much more effectively than others pursue a 'stick-and-carrot' policy putting its financial support under political conditionality liked to progress in conflict resolution processes." 49 However, the extent to which EU member states will demonstrate the necessary political will to an enlarged involvement, in a particularly unstable area where the intersection of competing interests has been clear, remains to be seen. Further involvement, closer monitoring, and eventually intensification in political and economic pressure through some form of conditionality associated with this deepened EU commitment to the area could make a difference in the building of stability in a much unstable region, despite all the known limits and restraints.
48 "Heikki Talvite: EU to Prepare Report on the South Caucasus Countries," AzerNews ( November 11, 2004) . 49 Mariam Dekanozishvili, supra note 22: 9-10.
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CONCLUSION
The European Union's wish to gain more prominence in security matters has become real, but whether the commitment to render it truly operational will become a reality still remains to be seen. The Iraqi affair, as a practical example of the existing contradictions within the Union and of its consequent inability to formulate a common position on the issue, may serve as a lesson. The European Security Strategy might be an important part of this lesson, seeking to cope with a fundamental handicap-namely, the need for a map to help avoid further detours and directional missteps. Which lines of consensus will be developed and which will have an impact regarding security and defense, are fundamental questions not only for Europe but also at the global level. "It is not the words but the deeds that count in international politics. The EU has now accumulated political will and resources in order to start making a difference in the field of peace and security, as it is already doing in the global market." 50 Whether it will manage internal differences and gather the necessary support for an active engagement in security matters in its vicinity is still to be seen. The cards are on the table and the game has already started, but the rules are still not clear enough to allow the empowerment of a common, cohesive and directed strategy. The strategic partnerships that might be drawn between the Union and these states and its framing in a regional strategy have revealed complexity. Agreement over the Action Plans might bring some clarity, though the balancing of a regional approach with the specificities of each of the Caucasian countries shows the difficulty in finding commonality in a patchy scenario.
